I INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increase in the number of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered and publicly traded firms that "went dark," i. shareholders of record (the threshold is 500 shareholders of record for firms with less than $10 million in assets). 1 Despite this amendment, companies that have recently "gone dark" have included United
Road Services with over 6,000 beneficial shareholders and $97 million in total assets and ACAP Corporation with over 500 beneficial shareholders and $146 million in total assets. 1 Initial registration under the Exchange Act is triggered when the size of a company exceeds $10 million as measured by total assets and the number of holders of a class of its equity securities reaches 500. 2 For further details of these firms see Given that the number of beneficial shareholders and total assets of these companies appear to have exceeded the regulatory minimum for public registration, how have they been able to go dark? Why have they chosen to go dark (deregister with the SEC but remain publicly traded over-the-counter on the Pink Sheets)? Moreover, what have been the consequences for shareholders? The main objective of this paper is to address the above questions, especially in light of the concerns raised about this trend by institutional investors.
We find that firms with fewer valuable growth opportunities, greater insider ownership, lower institutional ownership, higher leverage and lower market momentum are more likely to go dark. Further, the direct costs of regulatory compliance -as reflected in higher audit feesalso appear to have been a major driving force behind the going dark phenomenon. In addition, our results comparing pre-and post-Sarbanes-Oxley deregistration decisions show that firms are more likely to go dark in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period and that the impact of audit fees on the probability of going dark has increased. We find also that investors suffer significant negative cumulative abnormal returns upon the announcement of deregistration and, post-going dark, are left holding significantly less liquid shares. Our paper makes a number of other contributions, including an examination of the incentives created by information asymmetries and conflicts of interest between inside and outside shareholders, an analysis of the effects of regulated financial institutions (e.g. banks) going dark on their shareholders, as well as an analysis of postderegistration stock price performance and liquidity effects.
As will be discussed in more detail below, the major mechanism for going dark is an outgrowth of the rapid dematerialization of shares as part of the SEC's effort to increase the efficiency of U.S. stock trading, brokerage and clearing. One of the outcomes of this dematerialization trend is that fewer and fewer shareholders are holding paper share certificates.
Instead, they hold their claims in electronic form with street names such as Merrill Lynch and other brokerage firms. As a result, the number of shareholders listed in corporate records as having been issued a paper stock certificate has shrunk. This is important, because it is the number of shareholders of record, rather than the number of beneficial shareholders, that is used by the SEC to determine whether the number of shareholders is below 300 (or 500 for firms with asset less than $10 million). For example, Merrill Lynch as the holder of the claims of many thousands of small investors would be counted as one certificate holder towards meeting the 300 (500) shareholder threshold.
With respect to prior research, Bushee and Leuz (2004) look at firms' registration decisions relating to the 1999 SEC "eligibility rule" requiring firms trading on the Over-theCounter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) to make a choice as to whether to register with the SEC or not.
If they chose not to register they had to leave the OTCBB for the Pink Sheets. They find significant negative abnormal returns upon removal from the OTCBB. Importantly, they did not examine the decision by firms to deregister and "go dark" as public firms, which is the focus of this paper. Engel, Hayes and Wang (2004) use event study analysis to look at the stock return effects for firms that chose to go private following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They found that firms going private following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 were smaller firms with greater inside ownership who experienced large positive abnormal returns.
However, decisions to go dark can have a very different effect on firm returns compared to going private decisions. 3 In a concurrent paper, Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2004) look at the impact of agency and corporate governance related factors on the deregistration decision using an unmatched sample. However, they do not examine the effect of the costs of regulatory compliance (such as audit fees), the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on firms' deregistration decisions and stock price performance post-deregistration.
Section II of our paper discusses potential mechanisms and motivations for firms going dark as well as descriptive statistics regarding their importance. Section III investigates reasons why firms go dark using first matched and then unmatched logit analysis as a robustness check. 4 Section IV examines the adverse and differential impact on shareholders of deregistration announcements by firms and banks. Section V examines trading after going dark. In particular, it examines the impact of deregistration on the price and liquidity behavior of going dark stocks as well as on their post-deregistration stock price performance. Section VI concludes and discusses the overall public policy implications of the going dark phenomenon in light of our results, including a possible amendment to SEC Rule 12g(5).
II GOING DARK

II.A The Mechanism of Going Dark
Unlike the wave of LBOs in the 1980s and 1990s, which involved raising large amounts of debt to buy out existing stockholders, "going dark" is very different in its mechanism and leverage implications. A typical example would be a hi-tech firm that went public during the 1999-2000 boom and was listed on NASDAQ. For reasons discussed in Section II.B below, it decides to go dark. This involves a two-step process for a company listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. The first step is to delist from the exchange which may take up to 21 days. The delisting announcement may also report the reason why the firm is delisting, for example, whether it is delisting because it plans to deregister with the SEC. Once delisted, the firm trades 4 A priori we believe the matched approach has many advantages over the unmatched approach. For example, the unmatched sample is unbalanced having a greater proportion of firms that trade on major exchanges rather than over-the counter and a smaller number of financial institutions than the going dark sample. These differences are statistically significant.
(if at all) on the OTC Bulletin Board 5 or on the Pink Sheets. 6 The firm may then file a Form 15 with the SEC requesting its deregistration. A full shareholder vote is not required: a firm with fewer than 300 (500) shareholders of record only needs the approval of its board of directors to deregister with the SEC. In general the deregistration takes up to 90 days to approve. On applying for deregistration the firm no longer has to file public information with the SEC as to its financial condition. That is, from an outside investor's perspective the firm has effectively "gone dark."
It is important to distinguish the voluntary decision to go dark from being involuntarily delisted by an exchange as a result of a firm's inability to comply with one or more of the exchange's listing requirements -see Macey, O'Hara and Pompilio (2004) and Panchapagesan and Werner (2004) . It is also important to distinguish the going dark decision from going private.
In going private a firm's insiders commonly repurchase existing shares from a firm's outsidersoften at a premium over current share prices -see, for example, Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2004) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984) . Firms that go dark do not make tender offers to buy 5 In order to be eligible to trade on the OTC Bulletin Board firms must remain current in their filings with the SEC or applicable regulatory authority. Also note that while the issuer pays for listing on a major exchange, it is the market maker who has to pay for quoting a company's shares for over-the-counter trading. Most trading rules that are enforced on major exchanges, such as the NYSE's uptick rule, do not apply in the over-the-counter markets. 6 The Pink Sheets is essentially a quotation service for subscribing market makers offering to trade in OTC issues, 
II.B Reasons for Going Dark
There appear to be two major reasons why firms are choosing to go dark. The first is related to the direct and indirect costs of regulatory compliance, especially following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 31, 2002. The second relates to a variety of economic incentives, particularly the self-interest of inside shareholders.
II.B.a Regulatory Incentives for Going Dark
Compliance with SEC reporting and governance requirements imposes a number of indirect and direct costs on publicly registered firms. Indirect costs primarily relate to the responsibility of corporate executives and boards in producing and verifying publicly available 7 Investors holding fewer than 500 pre-reverse split common shares are cashed out (i.e. no fractional shares are issued). In order to ensure a significant reduction in the number of holders of record, going dark transactions usually involve sizable split-ratios. 8 Depending on the state of incorporation and its articles of incorporation and by-laws, a company's board of directors may be able declare a reverse stock split without a vote by shareholders. 
II.C Data Description and Sources
To understand our sample it is important to remember the distinction between delisting from an exchange and deregistration with the SEC. All firms listed on one of the major exchanges or traded on the OTC Bulletin Board are required to be registered with the SEC. A firm that is delisted from an exchange will not necessarily deregister. However, a firm that decides to end its registration with the SEC while trading on a major exchange (or the OTCBB) must delist. Most of these firms then find their shares are moved to the Pink Sheets.
Deregistering firms were first identified by searching the SEC's EDGAR database for firms which filed a Form 15 to deregister all classes of their public securities over the January 1996 -May 2004 period. 10 We excluded firms which filed a Form 15 to deregister only their preferred stocks or publicly traded bonds.
The dates of deregistration announcements were determined based on press releases or newswire announcements collected from Form 8 or other SEC filings (proxy statements etc.), the Factiva database and firms' web sites. Firms which filed to deregister as a result of a merger, bankruptcy or liquidation were dropped from the sample. We also dropped foreign firms. 11 After this procedure our total sample consisted of 406 firms.
The logit analysis in Section III below requires the availability of both accounting and share price information. Accounting information is from Compustat as well as from Edgar.
Datastream and Pink Sheets were our primary source of stock return and volume data. As a further screening of the deregistering sample (406 firms), we exclude firms that emerged from bankruptcy in the year before going dark, shell corporations, firms for which accounting or stock price data was not available and firms which were not publicly traded -either on a major exchange or over-the-counter -at the time of the announcement. After such screening we end up with a total deregistering sample of 261 firms. Table 1 To better understand the type of firms in our going dark sample we provide a few examples. The five largest deregistering firms are all financial institutions with total assets ranging from $344 million to $9.75 billion. First National of Nebraska Inc, a commercial bank, is the largest deregistering firm in our sample. The five smallest firms have total assets ranging 11 In general, foreign firms (typically American Depositary Receipts, ADRs) can only deregister if there are fewer than 300 beneficial owners (rather than holders of record) and they must give one-year notice to shareholders (for further details see Marosi and Massoud (2005) ).
from $0.138 to $0.502 million and are not concentrated in a particular industry.
III LOGIT ANALYSIS OF THE FIRM'S DECISION TO GO DARK
The 
III.A Logit Model and Variables
Our logit tests below focus on two samples: a matched sample of firms (sub-sections III.A and III.B) and an unmatched sample of firms (subsection III.C). As discussed in these subsections our results regarding the importance of various economic and regulatory incentives for going dark are generally robust across both the matched and unmatched samples.
III.A.a Matched Logit Analysis
We first use a matched logit analysis to identify the relative importance of different factors driving the going dark decision. The dependent variable is binary: 0 if the firm did not deregister and 1 if it did. We construct our matched holdout sample in a manner similar to Lehn and Poulsen (1989) . In addition to matching firms by industry, we also match by size since, a priori, we expect smaller firms to have a greater incentive to deregister than larger firms. Larger firms may be reluctant to deregister for a number of reasons including the need to retain public visibility so as to attract sufficient external financing in the future. The matching firms are chosen based on three criteria: (i) 4 digit SIC code, (ii) average asset size over the 3 years prior to the going dark announcement by the sample firm and (iii) the market 12 for the firm's common equity at the end of the last fiscal year prior to deregistration. 13 On a few occasions when it was difficult to choose between matching firms, we included both firms in the matching sample. In total we have 282 matching firms and 261 going dark firms for a combined sample of 543 firms. Table 2 , Panel 1, provides full details of the construction and source of our dependent and explanatory variables in the logit model.
Our choice of explanatory variables is predicated on our seeking to distinguish economic incentives from regulatory incentives. With respect to economic incentives, the q-ratio measures the firm's potential growth options. Firms with a high q-ratio may prefer to stay public since they are better able to raise additional external financing in capital markets. Alternatively, insiders may wish to take high q-ratio firms dark so as to be better able to expropriate the implied growth options inherent in a high q-ratio. That is, having a higher q-ratio may either increase or decrease a firm's probability of going dark.
Insider ownership stakes -the percentage of voting common equity controlled by managers and directors of the company -may also be expected to influence the going dark 12 We distinguished between two types of equity markets: major organized exchanges (NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) and over-the-counter markets (the OTCBB and the Pink Sheets). 13 Where possible, we also matched by "age," selecting matching firms that became public approximately the same time as the going dark firm. Also, we found that the stock price levels of going dark and matching firms were not significantly different.
decision for both corporate governance cost and cash flow expropriation reasons. The more concentrated is the voting power of insiders the easier it is to ensure sufficient votes to take a firm dark.
According to the extant literature, the larger is a firm's cash flow, the stronger the incentive to take that firm private (Jensen (1986) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989) ). However, (1) where T -150 and T -31 are the first and the last trading day we use to calculate buy and hold returns, R jt is the daily return for sample firm j on date t, and R mt is the return on the Russell 2000 Index on the same date. We chose the Russell 2000 because the firms covered are relatively small.
The average daily volume or turnover is also measured from 150 to 31 trading days prior to the deregistration announcement. The leverage variable is motivated by earlier results from the disclosure literature. Palepu (1987) , Healy and Palepu (1990) , and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996) find that highly leveraged firms are more likely to make strategic decisions (here the decision to go dark) to conserve cash. 15 Finally, the log of the firm's assets is introduced to control for any remaining size effects on the decision to go dark.
Audit fees reflect some of the most obvious and measurable costs of regulatory compliance. As noted above, the audit-related costs of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance have been viewed as a primary reason for firms' choosing to go dark. We considered two measures of audit fees: the ratio of audit fees to the market value of the firm's equity and the natural log of audit fees. The audit fee was obtained from the Audit Analytics data base. 16 In addition, we examine the impact of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley on the likelihood of going dark using a dummy variable. A financial institution dummy is also introduced since regulated financial institutions will have to continue to report to regulators after deregistering with the SEC and therefore may have different incentives to go dark. Table 3 presents the coefficient score results of the logit analysis together with the elasticity (economic importance) for each of the explanatory variables described above. The elasticities for each explanatory variable were calculated as
III.B The Matched Logit Results
, where d is the first derivative, is the natural logarithm of the density function and is the natural logarithm of the explanatory variable, and are evaluated at their sample means. In Table 3 , we examine five models, starting with a set of variables for which observations are available for the entire sample proxy statements became mandatory only after February 5, 2001. 17 As can be seen from Table 3 firms with a high q-ratio have lower incentives to go dark.
For example a 1% increase in the q-ratio lowers the probability of going dark by 30% (from its mean value) in model 5. This suggests that staying registered allows relatively profitable firms the benefit of continued access to external equity funding so as to finance their profitable (high q-ratio) investments.
Free cash flow is statistically insignificant throughout the models tested in Table 3 . The primary reason for this is that, unlike LBOs, the cash flow of going dark firms has been on average low over our sample period. Indeed, for 120 firms out of 261 in the deregistering sample, cash flow was actually negative in the year prior to deregistration.
The cash flow and q-ratio interaction dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the cash flow is positive and the q-ratio of the firm is less than 1, i.e., has few future growth opportunities. For all other firms this variable takes a value of zero. As can be seen from Table 3 this interaction dummy variable is positive and significant (at the 5% level) in model 5, implying that positive cash flow firms with low q-ratios (low growth opportunities) are more likely to go dark.
However, it is not statistically significant in the other models.
As expected, the insider ownership variable is significantly positive at the 1% level for all relevant models. For example, the results of model 5 imply that a 1% increase in insider ownership increases the probability of going dark by 52% (from its mean value). The interaction of insider ownership with cash flow appears to be less important in explaining the going dark trend.
Consistent with the arguments made in the press and in public petitions to the SEC, the audit fee/MVE ratio -which reflects the direct costs of remaining registered -has a positive and significant (at the 5% level) effect on the probability of going dark. Moreover, a 1% increase in the audit fee/ MVE ratio increases the probability of going dark by 11% (from its mean value) in model 5 in Table 3 . In addition using the log of audit fees as an alternative measure produces a similar positive effect on the probability of going dark. Thus, importantly, we find that in addition to the economic and agency related incentives to go dark, audit costs have also been an important factor underlying the deregistration decision.
As implied by the disclosure literature, highly levered firms are more likely to go dark.
As can be seen, the leverage variable is positive and significant at 1% in all models in Table 3 .
For example a 1% increases in leverage increases the probability of going dark increase by 31% (in model 5). As expected, a positive share price momentum reduces the probability of going dark. Specifically, a 1% increase in the 120-day return momentum reduces the probability of going dark by 2% (significant at the 5% level) in model 5. The size variable (log of assets) is statistically significant and negative in models 1 to 4 but not significant in model 5. The coefficients for the intangible assets ratio and the financial institution (FI) dummy variable were statistically insignificant.
Overall, our results suggest that the main factors impacting a firm's decision to go dark are its q-ratio, its insider ownership concentration, leverage, momentum and its audit fees.
III.C Unmatched Logit Tests
Section III.B examined the factors driving the deregistration decision for a sample matched by asset size, equity market and industry. It could be argued that all firms with fewer than 300 (500) shareholders of record could go dark and thus should be the appropriate hold-out sample in a logit analysis. For completeness and as a robustness check we also constructed an unmatched sample by using all firms available on EDGAR with stockholders of record below 300 (500) over the 1996-2004 period (we refer to it as the unmatched control group). For the firms with holders of record greater or equal to 300 and less than 500, we only included firms with assets below $10 million in the past 3 years. We also excluded foreign firms, shell corporations, bankrupt firms and firms in their first year of registering with SEC (because they are not eligible to deregister). After such screening we are left with 1,860 firms in our sample.
Note that a firm could go dark during any year, as long as its holders of record satisfied the 300 (500) criteria. As a result, our sample may include some firms more than once. Overall, there are 7,114 firm-years in the sample. However, as discussed earlier, we believe that the matched approach has certain advantages over the unmatched approach in analyzing the going dark decision. Table 4 presents the coefficient score results and the elasticities (economic importance) of the logit analysis using the same explanatory variables discussed in section III.A. Comparing the results in Table 4 (the logit results using the unmatched control group) with those in Table 3 (the logit results using the matched control group), with the exception of the momentum and the financial institutions dummy we find similar results to the matched logit. In particular, both the audit cost and insider ownership variables remain statistically significant.
III.D Additional Robustness Checks
III.D.a The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley act's passage in July 2002 may also have altered firm's incentives for going dark. To examine this question we constructed a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm deregistered after the passage Sarbanes-Oxley in July 30, 2002 and zero otherwise. This dummy variable is also interacted with the audit fee ratio. Interestingly, we find both the dummy variable on its own as well as its interaction with audit fees, are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 18 This is consistent with the argument that firms are more likely to go dark post-Sarbanes-Oxley and that in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period the impact of audit fees has become more important.
III.D.b Institutional ownership
To examine the effects of institutional ownership, we collect institutional ownership data from the Thompson Financial database. There are institutional ownership data for 99 of the going dark firms and 124 of the matched firms. We collect these data from the quarter before the firm went dark. We find that institutional ownership to be negative and significant at the 1% level, with our prior results remaining generally unchanged. The logit model predicts that a 1% increase in institutional ownership decreases the probability of going dark by 36% (relative to its mean).
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IV THE IMPACT OF DEREGISTRATION ANNOUNCEMENTS ON STOCKHOLDERS
IV.A Announcement Effects
In this section we examine the impact of deregistration announcements on stockholders.
Over the period from January 1996 to May 2004 we identify 238 firms with stock price data available on Datastream as announcing planned deregistrations that were unrelated to 18 We also test the impact of the November 2001Enron/Arthur Andersen debacle on firms' incentives to go dark. We find that both the dummy variable on its own and its interaction with audit fees are positive and significant at the 1% level. Tables are available from the authors on request. 19 We also examine a variety of other variables that may have impacted a firm's decision to go dark but we found them insignificant. These variables include a dummy for hi-tech firms, past growth in sales revenue, the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales, capital expenditure growth, auditors turnover, executive compensation.
bankruptcies, liquidations or mergers. This comprises 188 non-financial firms and 50 financial
firms. 20 We analyze two event windows. The date of the announcement (the event date) is day 0 and the numbers in the parentheses identify the starting and ending date of each event window relative to the event date. The first window, (0,+1) attempts to capture the immediate impact of the deregistration announcement. The window (0,+5) recognizes the potentially slow public diffusion of these announcements due to the relatively small size of some of these firms. We focus our discussion primarily on the (0,1) day announcement effects. Panels 1a, 1b and 1c of Table 5 show the share price effect of going dark using three different definitions of the event date: (i) the earliest of the public announcement and the Form 15 filing, (ii) the announcement date and (iii) the filing date. As can be seen from Table 5 , for non-financial firms announcing their intention to deregister the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is significantly negative at the 1% level or better, and is large in absolute terms for all event windows. 21 For example, Table 5 shows that the (0,1) window mean cumulative abnormal returns were -12.03% However, investors may not be affected in the same way by all deregistration decisions.
For firms which announced their deregistration while still trading on a major exchange, the joint impact of the loss of disclosure and additional liquidity and oversight provided by the exchange may be greater than the announcement effect for firms which are trading over-the-counter. Panel 2 in Table 5 shows that the magnitude of the impact is greater for exchange listed deregistering 20 The sample size is different from that in the logit analysis, because the additional requirement of the availability of Datastream stock price data eliminated 24 firms from the original 261 firm sample. 21 We use standardized abnormal returns following Patell (1976 Table 5 it is evident that 22 These findings are consistent with our earlier logit analysis (see Section III). Small firms are affected more by compliance costs (as measured by audit fees) therefore they are more likely to deregister. But the market reaction is less severe than it is for larger firms since the audit cost savings are relatively greater for smaller firms. We find that the ratio of audit fees to assets is significantly higher for firms below median size than for larger firms. A univariate test confirms this result at the 1% level.
the negative impact for financial institutions in our sample is very different from that for nonfinancial institutions. Indeed, the -1.67% cumulative abnormal return for the (0,1) event window
is not significantly different from zero. Also, the difference between financial institutions' mean cumulative abnormal returns and those of non-financial firms is statistically significant at the 1% level for the (0,1) event window. 24 Finally, Panel 5 of Table 5 shows that limited share repurchases and reverse splits did not have a significant impact on investors' reaction to going dark.
IV.B Disentangling the Deregistration and Delisting Announcement Effect: a Robustness Check and Natural Experiment
One possibility is that the delisting announcement effect may add noise to our measurement of the deregistration announcement effect. As a robustness check we took the subsample of firms trading on the OTCBB prior to the passage of the 1999 regulation requiring firms trading on the OTCBB to register with the SEC. Firms that were traded on the OTCBB, prior to 1999, could deregister without delisting from the OTCBB. We also added firms traded on the Pink Sheets at the time of their deregistration announcement. They too did not have to delist if they deregistered. Essentially this sub-sample provides a natural experiment relating to the size of the pure deregistration effect in the OTC markets. We identified 40 such non-financial firms. As shown in Table 5 , Panel 6 their average cumulative abnormal return over the (0,1)
window period was -6.7%, which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 24 It might be noted that Basel II capital adequacy reforms have put greater emphasis on regulatory monitoring in their Pillar 2 reforms and this might further weaken the going dark effect on bank equity investors in the future.
V THE MARKET AFTER GOING DARK V.A The Impact of Deregistration on Liquidity
As described in Section IV, a firm that goes dark without buying out all outside shareholders imposes a significant value loss on existing stockholders. In this section, we examine one potential source of value loss, namely the reduction in liquidity. Liquidity may decline after going dark because (i) the lack of continued disclosure increases uncertainty and may lead to higher bid-ask spreads, and (ii) stocks of deregistered firms are no longer eligible for Return data, volume data and trading days were collected from Datastream. The results, presented in Table 6 , provide information on mean spreads, volume, volatility and trading days for different sub-samples.
As can be seen from Panel 1 in Table 6 , three out of five measures of liquidity -the bidask spread, volatility and trading days-suggest that on average the stocks that go dark become significantly less liquid. On the other hand, the dollar spread and volume traded were little affected for the whole sample. In general the stocks of deregistering non-financial firms in the different sub-samples (Panels 2 to 4 of Table 6 ) became less liquid. In particular, Table 6 in panel 2 we show the mean liquidity impact on firms deregistering while trading on a major exchange. In this case three out of five measures of liquidity show a significant worsening postderegistration. In Table 6 panel 3 we show the liquidity effects on non-financial OTC firms. In percentage terms, while the percentage spread, volatility and trading days for exchange listed firms moved in an adverse direction by 159%, 113% and 33%, respectively, the percentage spread, volatility and trading days for OTC listed firms moved in an adverse direction by 40%, 63% and 25%, respectively. Table 6 Panel 4 summarizes the liquidity effects for all non-financial firms.
Finally, Table 6 Panel 5 shows that the liquidity effects on deregistering financial institutions' stocks are less adverse than for deregistering firms in general. Indeed, only one of the five liquidity measures, the decrease in the number of trading days, shows an adverse move that is statistically significant. This is consistent with the post-deregistration production of information for regulatory purposes having a positive impact on the liquidity of financial institutions relative to non-financial firms after going dark.
V.B Post-Deregistration Stock Price Performance
We next examined the long-run stock return performance of going dark stocks. We first examined their six and one-year returns post deregistration. We also examined six-month and one-year returns for a sub-sample of firms that only had a full year of post deregistration data.
None of these holding period returns were significantly different from zero.
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VI CONCLUSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Consistent with anecdotal evidence, we find that the compliance cost -as measured by audit fees -and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have been among the major driving forces behind a firm's decision to go dark. Firms with fewer growth opportunities, greater insider ownership, lower institutional ownership, lower market momentum and higher leverage are also more likely to go dark. It is also clear that investors in firms suffer significant negative cumulative abnormal returns upon the announcement of deregistration and are generally left holding less liquid shares but this effect does not hold for regulated financial institutions.
The adverse impact on investors identified in this paper is the direct result of insiders' ability to exploit Section 12(g)(5) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. That is, insiders exploit the "300 shareholder rule" for remaining a publicly registered company; where "stockholders" are measured only by the number of shareholders of record rather than beneficial shareholders.
The cost of tracking the number of beneficial owners does not appear to be a sufficient argument in favor of maintaining this status quo. Indeed, firms are able to determine the number of their beneficial owners for all other purposes (such as soliciting proxies) without difficulty. Clearly the loss of shareholder value and liquidity as a consequence of this rule, suggests that there may be a case for the SEC to reexamine Section 12(g)(5) and its approach towards counting the minimum number of shareholders required for registration as a public company. Financial data were collected from many sources (Compustat and from a firm's filing 10K with the SEC) depending on its availability. Financial data, the data from filing DEF14 with the SEC (insider ownership) and Audit Fee Analytics for the deregistering firm's were collected from the last annual financial report before a firm went dark. For the matching firms, these data were collected from the same fiscal year of the sample firm. Spreads were collected from multiple sources (Datastream, CRSP and the Pink Sheets) depending on the availability of the data. Prices and volume were collected from Datastream.
Panel 1: Logit Variables Variables Description
Binary Dependent variable takes a value of 1 for firms who chose to go dark and 0 for the matching firms. The deregistered firms were matched based on three criteria: 1. Their 4 digit SIC code 2. Their asset size, 3 year average prior to the sample firms deregistration date. The matched firm's asset value may vary between the maximum and the minimum of the 3 years asset value. 3. Equity market: major exchange or OTC.
q-ratio
This measure was based on Chevalier's (2004) Tobin's Q measure, i.e., the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the book value of common equity.
Log of firm assets
The logarithm of the firm's asset value.
Intangible asset ratio
The ratio of the firm's intangible assets to total assets. Intangible assets include: blueprints or building designs, client lists, computer software patent costs, contract rights, costs associated with approved patents, copyrights design costs and etc..
Leverage
Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and alternatively the ratio of long-term debt over assets.
Financial institution (FI) dummy
Is one for firms from the financial sector (SIC codes 6020 to 6500) and zero otherwise.
Insider ownership
The ratio of holdings of common (voting) shares by all directors and officers as a group to total outstanding (voting) shares. The insider ownership ratio was hand collected from either proxy statements (form DEF14A) or Form 10K on the SEC's EDGAR database.
Audit fees to MVE
The dollar value of the annual audit fees paid by a firm for certifying its financial reports divided by the firm's market value of equity (MVE). The annual audit fees were obtained from the Audit Analytics database. It is usually reported by the firm in the proxy statement (form DEF14A) on the SEC's EDGAR database. This measure is based on the Opler and Titman (1993) measure of free cash flow, i.e., a firm's cash-flow is measured as operating income before taxes, interest and depreciation (EBITDA). It is expressed as a ratio of the market value of assets. The market value of asset is equal the risk adjusted sum of discounted cash flows. Accordingly, firms with relatively greater cash flow to market value today are expected to have relatively less cash flow growth in the future.
Insider (x) Free cash-flow (FCF)
Free-cash flow variable multiplied by insider ownership.
Dummy(q-ratio<1, free cashflow>0)
A dummy variable that is one when both the q-ratio is less than one and the free cash-flow variable is positive. The dummy is zero otherwise.
Momentum
Following Loughran and Ritter (1996) , we define momentum as buy and hold market-adjusted returns for the jth firm in our sample as:
, ,
where T -150 and T -31 are the first and the last trading day included in the holding period we use to calculate buy and hold returns (i.e. 150 and 31 trading days prior to the deregistration announcement, respectively), R jt is the daily return for sample firm j on date t, and R mt is the return on the Russell 2000 Index on the same date.
Volume (turnover)
It is computed as the ratio of average daily trading volume over a period of 150 trading days over total outstanding shares. We computed the turnover in the pre-deregistration period (t 0 -150 to t 0 -31), where t 0 is the effective deregistration date. In order to rule out the noise of the deregistration announcement on the volume (turnover), we excluded 30 days before that date.
a Our results are robust to an alternative measure of free cash flow. In particular, the measure suggested by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) . 
Mean volatility (%)
Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the daily returns of the stocks in the sample. It is computed over a period of 60 trading days. To analyze the change in mean volatility we compare it then before and after deregistration. To do this, we compare mean volatility in the pre-deregistration period (t 0 -90 to t 0 -31) with the that for the post-deregistration period (t 0 +31 to t 0 +90), where t 0 is the effective deregistration date. In order to rule out the noise of the deregistration announcement on mean volatility, we excluded the 30 days before and after the deregistration date.
Volume (Turnover) (%)
Volume traded over total outstanding shares x 100. Computed using the average daily trading volume over a period of 60 trading days. To analyze the change in relative turnover we compare it then before and after deregistration. To do this, we compare relative turnover in the pre-deregistration period (t 0 -90 to t 0 -31) with the relative turnover for the post-deregistration period (t 0 +31 to t 0 +90), where t 0 is the effective deregistration date. In order to rule out the noise of the deregistration announcement on the relative turnover, we excluded the 30 days before and after the deregistration date.
Trading days
The number of days a firm's stock is traded (days when the traded volume is greater than zero) over a period of 60 trading days. To analyze the change in relative trading we compare the trading days in the pre-deregistration period (t 0 -90 to t 0 -31) with the trading days for the post-deregistration period (t 0 +31 to t 0 +90), where t 0 is the effective deregistration date. We excluded the 30 days before and after the deregistration date in order to rule out the noise of the deregistration announcement on the trading days. The elasticity is evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. These tests exclude foreign firms, firms that emerged from bankruptcy in the year before going dark, shell corporations (a corporation without any business activity) and firms for which accounting or stock price data was not available. After such screening 261 firms remained in our sample. The matching firms were chosen based on three criteria: (i) a firm's 4 digit SIC code and (ii) a firm's average asset size over the 3 years prior to announcing it was going dark and (iii) the market for the common stock (major exchanges or over the counter) at the end of the last fiscal year prior to deregistration. The total number of matching firms is 282. This table reports the coefficient score results and the elasticity of logit tests for the going dark sample using the unmatched control group of all firms with holders of record less than 300/500. The dependent variable is binary that takes a value of one for the firms who chose to deregister and zero for the unmatched control group firms. The standard error (SE) is reported in parentheses and elasticity was calculated as d(lnF)/d(lnx), where d is the first derivative, ln(F) is the natural logarithm of the density function and ln(x) is the natural logarithm of the explanatory variable. The elasticity is evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. These tests exclude foreign firms, firms that emerged from bankruptcy in the year before going dark, shell corporations (a corporation without any business activity) and firms for which accounting or stock price data was not available. After such screening 261 firms remained in our going dark sample and 7114 in our unmatched control group. The Table below displays trading and liquidity information for the deregistered firms with the SEC. The bid-ask spread was collected from two sources CRSP (for the pre-deregistration period of sub-sample 1 the exchange deregistered firms) or the Pink Sheets. The return data, volume and number of trading days were collected from Datastream. Panels 1 to 5 provide measures of mean dollar spread, mean percentage spread, volatility volume and number of trading days for different sub groups. To analyze liquidity we compare liquidity before and after deregistration. To do this, we compare liquidity in the pre-deregistration period (t 0 -90 to t 0 -31) with liquidity for the post-deregistration period (t 0 +31 to t 0 + 90), where t 0 is the effective deregistration date. In order to rule out the noise of the deregistration announcement, we excluded 30 days before and after the deregistration date. We included only that sub-sample of going dark firms that have data from the Pink Sheets/Datastream and such data is available before and after deregistration. Dollar spreads are defined as (closing ask priceclosing bid price). Percentage spreads are calculated as (closing ask price -closing bid price) / (midpoint of closing ask and bid prices)×100. Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns of the stocks in the sample. Volume turnover is calculated as the percentage of average daily volume to outstanding shares. Trading days are calculated as the number of days when trading occurred. Difference of means tests is two-sided tests and assumes unequal variances.
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